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between human and social sciences. It also led to comparative research in Western Europe 
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environments and the role of these environments in their governance and performance. This 
approach includes evaluation of the various discourses, theories and disciplines studying the 
production and distribution of knowledge in societies.  
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1. Introduction: the triple helix model in a new context 
 
 With the present financial and economic crisis and growing environmental constraints, 
new versions of the Triple helix model are formulated and debated. It proves its strong 
heuristic value. From this perspective, Silicon Valley is neither a global model, nor a unique 
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anomaly. It certainly was an inspiration but constructing Silicon Valley into a model to 
imitate has proved a vain and costly exercise. Silicon Valley studies led to a more precise 
understanding of the singular conditions of its emergence and reinvention through time. Since 
the mid-1990s, the triple helix model proved more and more influential: it gave a method to 
analyze and evaluate the Silicon Valley phenomenon and it explained how Europeans and 
East Asians could find their own way and solutions. Still the evolution of Silicon Valley since 
2000 and the various debates on the triple helix model allow redefining the model according 
to some of its implementations and interpretations.  
 The environmental constraint (energy, global warming, etc) and the present economic 
crisis have transformed the conditions for research and innovation in all industrial nations. 
Overall, to describe situations and find solutions, the Triple helix model had and still has a 
growing influence at the regional, national and local level. Interpretations and 
implementations of the model differ according to contexts. Today, in this post-Fukushima 
context, comparing various versions of the model opens the possibility to redefine the model 
itself. Further more, the 2002 Triple helix conference in Copenhagen and the report by Loet 
Leydesdorff and Henry Etzkowitz, “Can the ‘public’ be considered as a fourth helix in 
University-Industry-Government relations
1
?” have opened the way for new research on the 
helix particularly relevant today in responding to the crisis. 
 
2. Learning from cases 
 
In France, no reference to the triple helix model is explicitly made, probably because 
the State still controls research and macro-manages the interactions between research 
institutions and the economy. Still the triple helix adequately describes recent reforms of 
universities and research institutions, their relations to industry and local economies. It also 
helps explaining their limitations, why they remain inadequate by comparison with reforms 
made in Germany in the last ten years. The model remarkably explains local research policies 
in France. For instance, Cluster policy of the Région Rhône-Alpes had (it ended in 2010) a 
highly positive influence on the formation of new research communities. Finally, if it was 
explicitly applied, it would explain why the creation of a new entity, University of Lyon
2
, 
                                                
1 Science and Public Policy, n° 30(1), 2003, p 55-61 
2 http://lyon-university.org/. The French version <http://www.universite-lyon.fr/> shows the scale and style of 
the project,. 
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associating eighteen universities and professional schools
3
, is reproducing the national French 
administrative model: it created a bureaucracy with interests and objectives of its own, which 
is already cut from the life and work of researchers. The only innovation is the creation a 
global academic structure, without real institutional innovations at the level of research and 
innovation processes. In such a case, the triple helix opens a description of the situation as 
well as an evaluation of the response to the situation.  
At the level of the European Union, the triple helix is the implicit model for science 
and technology policies, which are still hampered by the fact that these policies remain for 
each member states an expression of national sovereignty. This explains the failure of the 
2000 Lisbon strategy
4
: the EU was supposed to become in ten years the most advanced 
knowledge economy in the world, creating jobs and sustaining social cohesion. Well known 
specialists in Science studies, sociology of science and economics of innovation, including 
Christopher Freeman, played a key role in the conception of this policy. But politics and 
national interests could not be overcome: institutional innovations are real but their potentials 
are still limited.  
In Japan, notions of “co-dynamism “ and “co-evolution” are versions of the triple helix 
model. In contrast to France, these notions summarize significant institutional and political 
reforms made in the last ten years: reforms of the Ministries in charge of research and 
innovation, university reform, reform of government itself (the Science and Technology 
Agency is now part of the Prime minister office), reform of Industrial and Intellectual 
property regime, adaptation of the Basic plans for science and technology to the present 
situation of the Japanese economy and society
5
. The March catastrophe reinforces this 
evolution. Presenting the cases of Germany, Switzerland and Singapore would strengthen the 
following conclusions. 
Five points summarize the descriptive and heuristic value of the Triple helix model. It 
first overcomes the limitations of the “linear model
6
”. Secondly it explains how a “national 
system of innovation” is supposed to be organized, managed, to function and evolve: the 
                                                
3 The “grandes écoles” are simply highly selective national professional schools. 
4
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lisbon_Strategy. Its implementation was quickly considered 
« unconvincing ». 
5
 See A-M Rieu, “Le Japon comme société de connaissance: quelles leçons pour la France?”, in J.F. Sabouret 
(ed.), L’empire de l’intelligence: les politiques de recherche japonaises depuis 1945, Paris, CNRS Editions, 
2007, p 210-213. [http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00360130/fr/] 
6
 Benoît Godin, “The Linear model of innovation: the historical construction of an analytic framework”(Science, 
technology and human values, Sage Publications, vol. 31, n° 6, November 2008, p 639-667) and “National 
innovation system: the system approach in historical perspective” (Science, technology and human values, Sage 
Publications, vol. 34, n° 4, July 2009, p 476-501). Available at http://www.csiic.ca/ 
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concept is a method of evaluation and of policy conception. Third, it overcomes the 
opposition between private and public, between private investment in R&D at the level of 
firms and public policies. It builds a conceptual and practical framework where the two 
sectors learn how to cooperate in a joint dynamics regulated by political institutions
7
. Fourth, 
it introduces a new institutional model of organization and governance: ideally, none of the 
three helixes can or should control the other two. This type of governance is still difficult to 
conceive and organize. But it leads to institutional innovations and even progress in 
democracy, which are already explored and conceptualized
8
. In this context, Silicon Valley 
and the San Francisco Bay remain a reference case for reconstructing the Triple helix into an 
“ideal type” or theory in a “symmetric epistemology
9
”. 
 
3. The problem: growing standardization 
 
The strong influence of the Triple helix model is opening a better understanding of its 
limitations and presuppositions. Explicitly or not, it is still inspiring strong debates, research 
and institutional reforms. But the adoption and adaptation of the model has also transformed 
this conceptual construct into an international norm. This evolution opens new debates and 
research because some counter productive effects are identified or anticipated. For instance, 
comparing recent research and innovation policies in European Union and Japan
10
 shows 
what consequences can be observed or predicted with a high degree of probability. 
  
The first problem is an increased standardization of research. For research and other 
upstream activities, universities as well as national and regional research policies, competition 
has greatly intensified since the 1980ies. This competition now generates a growing 
standardization of research and innovation activities. Researchers in advanced industrial 
societies tend to work on the same fields and the same themes in institutional environments 
(organizations, hierarchies, even buildings), which to become very similar. The short-term 
and long-term consequence of this situation is a growing standardization. This is a complex 
situation. Competition reinforces this pattern of evolution. Science might be universal and 
                                                
7
 This is best exemplified in the early 1990s by Martin Fransmann, The market and beyond 
8
 Callon, Agir dans un monde incertain. 
9
 A symmetric epistemology is based on a theoretical construction capable of describing on the same pattern 
different cases, evolutions and situations. 
10
 Mainly Europe’s 7th Framework program for science and technology and Japan’s 3rd Basic plan for science 
and technology, both launched in 2006. Japan’s 4th Basic plan was supposed to be launched in April 2011 but 
was postponed until the end of August 2011. It had to be revised in order to respond to the March 2011 tsunami 
and Fukushima catastrophe.  
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technology generic, we observe the emergence of various types of “knowledge economy”, in 
the US and Japan as well as in Europe, but also in China, Russia or Brazil. These various 
types of knowledge economy compete with each other. This intensified competition is further 
reinforcing standardization. Each nation intends to catch up to the point there is no leader 
anymore. Even if they have historical precedents in the 17
th
 or 19
th
 centuries in Europe, these 
are new challenges. These problems express the mutation of the conception, organization and 
role of all knowledge activities in advanced industrial societies since the 1980, the new 
“regime of knowledge” in which our societies develop.  
All major research institutions have now the same priorities and objectives. They do 
not imitate each other but they have entered a mimetic competition process, which is 
reinforcing itself into a convergent trajectory. The benefits are real: research standardization 
facilitates worldwide cooperation of researchers, laboratories and research programs. This 
convergence even reinforces quality standards and hierarchies, the search for “excellence”. 
But this standardization creates two problems: underneath global and even “open” 
cooperation, it intensifies competition between laboratories, between nations and regions 
according to their capacity not to generate new research and progress but to transform this 
new knowledge into innovations, new industries and new products. This situation has obvious 
positive consequences but the reforms, which can be observed, tend to replicate the model and 
therefore intensify the mimetic effect. It further intensifies standardization. From the point of 
view of the two main challenges, the intensified environmental constraint and the economic 
crisis, results are below expectations. Innovations in the US or Japan do not generate new 
industries, products and jobs. Established conceptions of innovation and research policies do 
not fully respond to the present conjuncture. 
This situation has also an impact on the other end of the innovation process, on 
research and research institutions. Because of this cooperation and standardization, where 
progress really happens in the world is apparently becoming secondary. Few laboratories are 
making a difference between the progress they really make and the progress they participate 
in. Laboratories and researchers have the feeling to belong to a general progress in science 
and technology. This evolution is obviously reinforced by the need to respond to the 
economic and social situation. Research itself and research institutions are following a 
potentially dangerous path. This is the second problem: self-reinforcing standardization 
reduces research and innovation diversity. The reduction of this diversity has a negative 
impact on research and innovation evolutionary potentials and therefore on long-term 
progress. The present growth of research activities intensifies this negative impact. This does 
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not mean that standardization sterilizes research but reducing its diversity generates a long-
term path dependency. It seems strange to defend biodiversity and at the same time be blind to 
the necessity of sustaining and even increasing research diversity.  
 
4. The source of the problem: the neo-liberal tsunami 
 
The standardization of research and the reduction of evolutionary potentials need to be 
put in a broader perspective. As mentioned before, the convergence of research fields and 
research organizations brings obvious benefits: it concentrates and aggregates human capital 
and financial resources. It rationalizes knowledge production and distribution for economic 
growth and social progress. This convergence is also the result of scientific methodologies 
and large-scale communication of data and research outcomes as well as the result of the 
increased exchange and circulation of researchers. These positive elements cannot be ignored 
when Humanity is facing increased challenges, deceases, unequal access to food, education 
and information, energy shortages, industrial pollutions and climate change, not to mention 
security issues. But these positive elements need today to be reinterpreted according to the 
present context.  
Since the 1980ies, this convergence has not only intensified but it also mutated. The 
first crisis of energy and natural resources in 1970s was the first sign of the emergence of an 
environmental constraint and the first proof that it would transform in depth our economies, 
societies and international relations. Beyond politics and ideology, the neo-liberal theory and 
its various practices have been a response in the 1980s to this crisis. This explains why today 
neo-liberal solutions are still implemented in order to solve problems generated by these 
solutions. In this context, a new “regime of knowledge” has emerged and was identified. But 
its presuppositions and long-term consequences are not yet fully analyzed and evaluated. The 
convergence of research fields, R&I models and institutions is certainly driven by the need to 
produce new knowledge but this need is also driven by an intensified competition between 
economies and societies. The US, Japan and West-European nations have been sharing the 
same diagnosis of the present world conjuncture and they have one after the other 
implemented a similar response to the globalization process: in the 1990s, it became clear that 
the long-term future of each advanced industrial societies was to be found in their capacity to 
generate new knowledge and to translate innovation into new companies and new products, 
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which would create growth, jobs, State revenues for financing welfare policies and 
infrastructures
11
.  
In this context, the competition in Science and Technology between all OECD nations 
intensified. This new wave of industrial and political competition stimulated all activities 
related to the production and transfer of knowledge. The main actors of this change were not 
only managers or politicians; they were scientists, researchers, engineers, even post-doctoral 
students, and also specialists of recent disciplines like science studies and management of 
technology. Research policies found a new meaning and a new urgency. Until then, these 
actors were deeply embedded in social and political systems. Now their interests and values, 
the logic of their activities became more openly asserted. Many reforms of research 
institutions, universities, national systems of innovation, etc, have been developed in the last 
fifteen years. This evolution has its ideology: the formation and management of a “knowledge 
economy” often taken for a “knowledge society
12
”. This is at stake in both the EU Lisbon 
strategy and the EU seven Framework programs for Science and Technology as well as in 
Japan’s three Basic Plans. This is also at stake in the various debates, reports and policies in 
the US concerning competitiveness and innovation
13
. Silicon Valley remains a model but this 
model is not an overall solution.  
 The increased standardization resulting from a shared diagnosis and similar responses 
has reinforced the hegemony of the nation at the source of this process and most advanced in 
it: the US. The challenge of sustaining this hegemony is not a recent issue for the US: it dates 
as far back as the late 1980s
14
. When the level of convergence generates standardization of 
research fields, institutions and policies, beyond quantitative indexes of scientific progress, 
leadership becomes sheer hegemony. This hegemony generates negative effects and become 
unsustainable. Today all industrial nations, including China and India, tend to train their 
scientists and engineers, organize their research institutions and even their territory according 
to a model developed in the US. Their basic goal is not to produce new knowledge but to 
compete with the United States and reduce their hegemony or leadership. This could be 
                                                
11 Concerning Japan, see A-M Rieu, "Japan as a techno-scientific society: the new role of Research & 
Development", Tokyo, National Institute for Research Advancement Review, Autumn 1996, p 3-6. 
http://www.nira.or.jp/past/publ/review/96autumn/rieu.html 
12 On the need to draw a distinction between “knowledge economy” and “knowledge society”, see A-M Rieu, 
“What is Knowledge Society?”, STS Nexus, Santa Clara University, Center for Science, Technology and Society, 
San Jose, September 2005. http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00552293/fr/ 
13 See for instance the reports published by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation 
(http://www.itif.org) or the role of innovation in President Obama’s 2011 State of the Union speech. 
14 The Washington DC Council on competitiveness was founded in 1986. See http://www.compete.org. Its 
reports tell the story of American anxiety of losing the basis of its post-war economic and military hegemony.  
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accepted as long as it was generating positive effects for all players. But in the face of 
growing environmental constraints and following the present financial and economic crisis, it 
has become counter-productive. In the past, competition through collaboration intensified 
knowledge creation and innovation. Increasing standardization now reduces research diversity 
and in the end science and technology’s productivity. 
The triple helix model developed in this context: it was achieving two contradictory 
tasks. In the context opened in 1980s by the Bayh-Dole Act, it was first explaining how 
economic growth required a new institutional arrangement in order to strengthen innovation. 
Universities were decoupled from public policies and connected to business creation and 
growth. In return, they found in this academic new deal new financing resources for research 
and innovation: they gain also new responsibilities. But the triple helix model was also 
explaining how to reach and manage equilibrium between le role of government, industry and 
universities. The Triple helix belongs to the neo-liberal movement, which changed the world 
since the 1980s. But the Triple helix was also regulating this movement by explaining that 
economic development was based on innovation and that innovation processes were based on 
collaboration and interaction between university, industry and government, each with its own 
logic and responsibility. The Triple helix is also showing a path beyond the neo-liberal 
moment. 
 
5. A solution: a fourth helix for restoring and increasing research diversity 
 
 Reversing the trend toward standardization has for goal to assure research long-term 
productivity in order to meet today challenges. The problem is to organize and sustain 
research diversity. Andy Stirling has built a conceptual and formal framework for studying 
and managing diversity: “Diversity concepts employed across the full range of sciences 
mentioned above, display some combination of just three basic properties: (…) ‘variety’, 
‘balance’ and ‘disparity’
15
”. The plurality (variety) of research traditions depends on their 
historical, social, cultural and even economic contexts. But today saving this plurality does 
not mean securing or protecting an imagined historical scientific or technical identity 
(disparity). It means producing new knowledge and to innovate in a world of intensified and 
mimetic competition. It means stepping out of this competition by developing alternative or 
                                                
15 “A General Framework for Analyzing Diversity in Science, Technology and Society”, SPRU on-line paper n° 
156, February 2007, p 9 (http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/).  
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simply different perspectives. There is nothing heroic to this. Restoring or creating diversity 
depends first of all on the capacity of academic and research communities to conceive and 
debate their own objectives, methods and values, to find a “balance” between variety and 
disparity. Institutional innovation and academic autonomy are the key issues in this process. 
The problem is not to isolate or protect research universities from their economic contexts and 
social duties. On the contrary, the problem is to give research communities an increased 
capacity to negotiate with firms and government their priorities and responsibilities.  
The triple helix model responds to this situation. It shows that the “research 
university” is not submitted to its interactions between firms and government. It has to assert 
and play its full role. Institutional innovation does not mean that a research university should 
be organized and managed like a firm. It simply requires stressing the logic of research and 
innovation, of teaching and training, the various time frames of these activities and their 
specific institutional requirements.  Diversity is a requirement for progress in science and 
technology as important than standardization. Of course a balance between the two needs to 
be found but the risk to differ and develop new fields and hypothesis is also a basic duty and 
responsibility.  
Finally this implies a different conception of competition. To compete within the same 
model and for the same objectives is quite different than competing on different grounds and 
for alternative but also complementary objectives. New modes of collaboration and positive 
competition can be imagined. Collaborative competition is a key issue. Positive competition 
does not or should reduce diversity but on the contrary reinforce diversity, intensify global 
progress and common knowledge. The Triple helix model is reaching a point where long-term 
and collective progress should become a goal for all knowledge-based societies. 
 
Therefore the only way to respond to standardization and negative competition is to 
restore and intensify diversity. This requires the introduction of a fourth helix. In fact, a fourth 
helix was always in the middle of the triangle made by government, universities and firms. To 
give a name and content to this fourth helix has become a major question to research and 
debate in great details. First of all, the fourth helix should not be reduced to “culture”, to 
national traditions because of historical State control over research activities. Various 
researchers explained in recent debates that a fourth helix should be understood as “society
16
”. 
The problem is to define what “society” really means in this context. Various answers and 
                                                
16 What “society” means in this sense is far from clear.  
 10 
experiments exist and need to be debated: connecting to civil society, solving social problems, 
answering social needs, reducing inequities and inequalities, easing everyday life, developing 
public infrastructure and services, creating jobs and employment, establishing a clean and safe 
environment as well as sustainable social and economic development.  
The introduction of a fourth helix transforms the model in many ways. The fourth 
helix has clearly for role to regulate interactions between universities, government and the 
State administration, firms, industries and their related services. Industrial property law and 
technology transfer offices in universities are playing such a role. Finally, the fourth helix is 
playing a basic political role outside established political institutions. This role reconfigures 
the relations between politics and technology, research and economics, civil society and 
research, politics and economics. This mutation was predictable: when science and 
technology concern all aspects of life in society, the way we are educated, work, commute, 
communicate and even reproduce, a mutation is sooner or later taking place. All these aspects 
of life in society become first the target of science and technology policies but they also 
become the source and inspiration of all these policies. The best example is the “social turn” 
of Japan’s 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Basic plan for science and technology. 
This is not enough. The fourth helix needs to receive a practical meaning in order to 
play its role in relation to universities, government and the economy. It needs to be structured 
and organized. Various solutions are implemented: on-line survey at the EU, citizen debates, 
studies on social needs and social problems, etc. These solutions are difficult to evaluate. 
Further research is needed. To refer to “society” is to indicate the opening of a new or 
different “public space”. Such a public space cannot be reduced to “citizen debates”. It is 
difficult to invoke “society” without referring to the role of human and social sciences. The 
need to study these issues and problems is a major concern for these disciplines. The need to 
disseminate their findings is crucial for society. Crucial also is to reform the formation of 
scientists and engineers at all level so that they see their work not only “from inside out” as 
they always did but also “from outside in”, from the point of view of society. This social turn 
of science and technology policy is slowly reorienting research toward different local goals 
and situated priorities. This social turn is also a turn toward growing diversity.  
 
6. Escaping from the mimetic trap: the case of Japan 
 
 In the early 1990s, the “bubble” crisis forced the administration to restructure Japan’s 
research system. The proliferation and disparity of programs in the 1980s were costly and 
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inefficient, far below expectation. Because of the amount of partners (ministries, companies, 
universities, etc) involved and of the fields concerned, two large programs were organized: 
the Industrial Science and Technology Frontier Program and the New Sunshine Program for 
new energy sources and environmental technologies. Their demarcation shows Japan’s long-
term priority was explicitly to respond to the environmental constraint by articulating green 
research and industry in the hope to build a different social and economic system. This 
restructuring led to a final reform establishing a new and coherent research and innovation 
system. The goal for Japan was not simply to have a strong Science and Technology policy: 
the objective was to build this policy within the institutional system and in return to adapt the 
institutional system to the role and output of this policy. In 1995, was voted the Basic Law for 
Science and Technology. According to his basic law, three basic plans have been developed 
from 1996 to 2011. Spending on science and technology increased from 12.6 trillion yen 1995 
to 17.6 for the first plan, 21.1 trillion for the second and 21 trillion for the third plan. The size 
of these budgets teaches little about the plans themselves, their construction, intentions and 
internal dynamics. The first two plans had for goals to reform Japan’s system of research, 
innovation and education. The third Basic plan opened a different dynamics: to transform the 
interactions between research and innovation activities with both society and the economy.  
 The first Basic Plan, from fiscal 1996 to 2001, had for goal to open a new phase by 
increasing by 60% in five years the public budget for science and technology. In spite of the 
crisis, the budget was granted. The plan had for priority to modernize research infrastructures 
and create new ones. The second Basic Plan, from 2001 to 2006, had for objective to reform 
in depth universities ad the university system, to draw a line between public and private 
universities and to give public universities financial and administrative autonomy. Public 
universities had to become accountable of their management (including profitability) and of 
their research and teaching performance. To stimulate research and open new fields, a Center 
Of Excellence (COE) program was established in order to provide financial incentives for 
innovative projects on a competitive basis. The effective outcome of such reforms is always 
below expectation and is always criticized. Nonetheless the COE program has indeed 
stimulated innovative research projects in many fields. 
 The third Basic Plan, from 2006 to 2011, was launched in March 2006
17
. Its 
conception and goals were different. It was based on a large inquiry to identify both the 
worldwide state of research and the needs of Japan’s population. The goal was to respond to 
                                                
17
 See NISTEP Report n° 99, Comprehensive Analysis of Science and Technology Benchmarking and Foresight, 
Tokyo, May 2005.  
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the economic and financial situation and to take into account Japan’s social constraints
18
: the 
aging of the population, the demographic decline and low birth rate, the rising cost and 
scarcity of energy and the environmental constraint in general, the increased competition with 
Chinese economy, growing international instability. At mid-course, the third plan was 
disrupted by the 2007 crisis. Japan was hit where it hurt the most: its economy was partially 
restructured and in 2004 and 2005 it started to grow. But the year 2008 proved how fragile 
were this growth and recovery: high tech industries were far too dependent on foreign markets 
and global economic growth. The time of an export oriented economy based on always higher 
added value industries and products could not anymore sustain Japan’s long-term economic 
and social development. But all industrial nations, including recently the US, have been 
implementing the same strategy, which was also becoming a dead end. Japan found itself 
caught in a mimetic trap. The resulting adaptation and revision led to the conception of the 
next plan, the fourth Basic Plan. But this third plan expresses what should be called the social 
turn of science and technology policy in Japan.  
 The fourth Basic Plan should have been launched in April 2011. Because of the crisis, 
discussions have been more inclusive because this plan will have to make a difference in 
order to justify the same level of public funding. The population will have to see the 
difference in its daily life, its standard of living and public services. According to available 
documents, the plan will intensify the third plan’s orientation toward solving pressing 
problems. Small and medium size companies and even new industries, new jobs, new services 
responding to the present needs of Japan’s population will have to be created or reinforced. 
The fourth plan is raising high expectations: it has to respond to the growing disappointment 
toward science and technology policies according to criteria of “social accountability”. In 
summary, innovation has to make sense, to produce growth, create jobs and satisfy real needs. 
Innovation is not about the future but the present. Beneath marketing and political slogans, a 
real problem is raised by Japan’s techno-structure: the 2007-2011 crisis requires a deep 
revision of the economic strategy based on scientific progress and technological innovation 
designed in the early 1990s.  
 Intense debate has been taking place since 2008 and a consensus is now emerging
19
. 
The social turn has opened new perspectives, which are considered worth exploring. 
                                                
18
 Reports and studies are available at the website of National Institute for Science and Technology Policy 
(NISTEP): www.nistep.go.jp/.  
19
 I have drawn from articles and presentations  by Arimoto Tateo, director of the Research Institute of Science 
and Technology for Society (RISTEX), Japan Science and Technology Agency, and by Harayama Yuko, 
Tohoku University and OECD. See Arimoto Tateo, « Innovation policy for Japan in a new era », in H. Whittaker 
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According to this “new paradigm of innovation”, in order to benefit the Japanese people, 
Research and innovation policies have to learn how to articulate and manage different goals 
within the same policy. They have to respond to practical problems and as the same time 
sustain world-class research. This requires innovations in research governance, a new way of 
conceiving, organizing and managing research and innovation. “Society” is a search for new 
interaction between universities, firms and the State. Various documents, debates and 
reports
20
 show that the goal is not to put as usual new products on the market to respond to 
demand. The goal is to identify real social needs and to try to satisfy these needs in order to 
create new products and open markets from them. In this perspective, the neo-liberal “market” 
is not anymore the center of the social system. “Society”, people in their daily life and 
problems, become the center of society. The problem is not anymore to organize and reform a 
“national system of innovation”. Obviously in Japan today, debates and research show that the 
problem is to negotiate and organize the emergence of a new “innovation ecosystem” within 
society itself and from the point of view of society.  
 This notion had to take a practical meaning and become a social experimentation: to 
learn how to associate into a constructive debate various actors and partners from very 
different sectors and with different interests and values. The March 2011 Kanto and Tohoku 
earthquake and Fukushima catastrophe will obviously reinforce and fully justify this 
evolution. Japan research policy is reorganized toward the reconstruction not only of the 
regions destroyed by the tsunami but of the Japanese economy and society as a whole. This 
reconstruction will be the first full scale experimentation in a fourth helix. 
 
7. Conclusion: irreversibility, risk and democracy 
 
 Japan is often considered a dragon of the last century. But by inventing such a solution 
to its complex crisis, Japan is in advance and a forerunner. It is trying to escape from the neo-
liberal endless trap and its “race to the bottom”. The present debate in Japan shows that social 
innovation is of equal relevance than technological innovation. However fuzzy this 
conception might seem, it is an alternative to the neo-liberal paradigm and a step beyond the 
neo-liberal era. Neo-liberal policies implement successive decoupling in search of a ground 
for rebuilding competitiveness. In the end, this ground is found in research and innovation. 
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But science and technology activities, universities, companies and State institutions have all 
to be reorganized according this neo-liberal model in order to provide expected results and 
solutions. In the alternative Research and innovation paradigm experienced in Japan since the 
1990s, a decoupling process has emancipated and reformed research, innovation and 
education institutions. But this decoupling has found a ground. A recouping is taking shape at 
the level of “society”, of a so-called “ecosystem of innovation”, which is a platform 
associating the various components of this system. This solution is not yet clearly defined; it 
requires intense research in Human and Social Sciences. But a full-scale experiment is taking 
place in Japan.  
 Finally, the intellectual competence and the level of financial investment required for 
designing and implementing such a Basic plan for science and technology are so high that the 
resulting orientation is, or nearly is, irreversible
21
. Collective time and money spent on these 
science and technology policies are not anymore available for exploring other solutions. A 
trajectory path is created and will last. The society, which designs such a large-scale policy, is 
therefore taking an extreme risk. The only solution to manage such a risk is to share it 
amongst the largest amount possible of people. To associate the largest amount of people is 
also to reduce as much as possible this risk. The only solution to manage this situation is to 
organize such a policy as an experiment in advanced democracy. Citizen debates have 
become commonplace, with mixed result. These small-scale citizen debates are just a 
forerunner of a major political reform adapted to the growing environmental constraint, to 
comprehensive research and innovation policies and to the transformations of our social and 
economic systems. Understood from the point of view of society, such science and technology 
policies will soon require new political philosophy and institutions. 
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